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1 INTRODUCTION
The coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic has led governments, health agencies, and technology companies to develop
solutions to control the spread of this infectious disease. Digital contact tracing (or proximity tracing) has been proposed
to help break the chain of COVID-19 infections, complement manual tracing [6], and relax lockdown restrictions. Many
countries around the globe have launched national contact tracing apps that individuals can voluntarily download on
their smartphones (notifying users if they have been in close proximity to someone who has tested positive for COVID-
19 [25]). However, the effectiveness (or utility) of these apps – whether centralized (like the French TousAntiCovid [17]
based on ROBERT [5]) or decentralized (like the German Corona-Warn-App [31] based on DP-3T [34]) – highly depends
on their widespread adoption by the general population.
Several user studies – mainly surveys (e.g., [2, 20, 22, 32]) – have quantitatively explored how users perceive the use
and features of contact tracing apps. In this paper, we present our study, conducted in November 2020, consisting of
eight focus groups with participants living in France and Germany, to qualitatively understand: (1) the factors that
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influence people’s decision to adopt and use a contact tracing app; (2) people’s perceived benefits and drawbacks of
such an app; and (3) people’s perceived threat/adversarial model of a contact tracing app.
Paper structure. First, we provide a short background on contact tracing apps and present related work in this domain.
This is followed by an overview of the epidemiological situation in France and Germany in the second half of 2020 to
better understand the context within which our study was conducted. We then describe our study design and present
our findings. We conclude with a discussion and provide a set of recommendations and future work directions.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Contact tracing is a process in which public health workers interview people who have been diagnosed with an
infectious disease in an attempt to prevent onward transmission by identifying their recent contacts and isolating those
who are at risk [24, 26, 27]. As the COVID-19 pandemic has raged, a wide range of contact tracing smartphone apps
have been developed to control the spread of the virus [23] and supplement manual contact tracing. The purpose of
these apps is to identify and notify people of potential exposure to COVID-19 in an effort to keep infection rates low
while allowing greater freedom of movement. Some apps have been designed by a small number of researchers and
coders, while others jointly by states, medics, and tech companies like Google and Apple [3].
By the end of March 2020 and the beginning of April 2020, many countries started to deploy contact tracing apps
to combat the spread of the pandemic. However, national and local preferences have differed across countries in
terms of app design, data storage, involvement of research institutes and technology companies in the app design
and development stages, and adoption rate. For example, several European countries including Austria and Germany
decided to deploy contact tracing apps using the Bluetooth technology and following the decentralized approach,
whereas other countries like China and Singapore chose the centralized approach [14, 23]. In some other countries,
public health authorities released apps using Apple and Google’s Exposure Notification API [23]. The use of contact
tracing apps was mandatory in some countries and voluntary in others (partially explaining the low adoption rate of
some contact tracing apps).
Despite the influx of contact tracing apps, very little was known about their societal impact: how many people will
download and use these apps? What will make people continue using them? How widely used do the apps have to be
in order to succeed? How do people perceive the benefits and drawbacks of such apps? Are there any cross-cultural
differences in people’s perceptions, expectations, and privacy concerns with regard to these apps?
Online surveys. Prior work has examined public opinion of contact tracing smartphone apps. Zhang et al. conducted
one of the earliest survey studies (2,612 participants) between March 30 and April 1, 2020, to explore Americans’
perceptions of privacy and surveillance during the COVID-19 pandemic [38]. Preliminary results showed that Americans
preferred the use of manual tracing and traditional health screenings over contact tracing smartphone apps. Abeler
et al. conducted a survey of 1,055 respondents residing in the UK in March 2020 (just before the first lockdown was
imposed in the UK and before any contact tracing app was deployed) [1]. About three-quarters of respondents said they
would definitely or probably download and use a contact tracing app – though some respondents cited the following as
barriers to adoption: risk of government surveillance and fear of user’s phone being compromised. Further, Altmann
et al. conducted a survey of 5,995 respondents recruited from five countries (France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the
US) between March 2020 and April 2020, to measure public support for contact tracing apps [2]. Although none of the
respondents had used a contact tracing app in the past, German and US respondents were less supportive of contact
tracing apps compared to respondents from other countries – citing security and privacy concerns. Using a study
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similar to that of Altmann et al., Kostka and Habich-Sobiegalla studied public acceptance of contact tracing apps in
China, Germany, and the US in June 2020; they also found that respondents recruited from Germany and the US were
much less accepting of using a contact tracing app than those recruited from China [21]. Other similar survey studies
have been conducted [19, 20, 22, 33, 35]. Trang et al., for instance, collected data from 518 participants in Germany
between April 20 and 24, 2020 investigating how the intention to install contact tracing apps is influenced by different
app specifications, focusing on three dimensions: benefit appeal, privacy design, and convenience design [33]. They
suggested that in order to achieve mass acceptance, policy makers should categorize a country’s population into three
major groups: critics, undecided, and advocates. Depending on where the majority falls, policy makers should employ
corresponding strategies; for example, communicating societal-benefit appeals and ensuring minimal privacy risks are
paramount for critics; for the undecided group, “convenience in app usage” is more important than highlighting privacy
risks, while societal-benefit appeals should be stressed even more.
Longitudinal studies. Garrett et al. examined public opinion over time in several countries (including Australia,
Germany, and the UK). They periodically recruited and surveyed respondents from these countries “in waves”. Garrett
et al. found that despite the widespread acceptance of contact tracing apps in Australia, download rates were lower than
what was predicted [13]. Simko et al. deployed a sequence of online surveys (100 respondents recruited from various
countries around the world per survey) as part of a longitudinal study [32]. They found that a significant minority of
the respondents had reservations about downloading and using a contact tracing app even in the best possible privacy
scenario (i.e., when a contact tracing app would provide “perfect data protection”).
Most user studies conducted to explore people’s privacy perceptions of and attitudes toward contact tracing smart-
phone apps have been quantitative studies (mainly surveys). Furthermore, they captured intentions to install or adopt a
contact tracing app as a proxy for actual behavior. Our work builds on prior work by providing qualitative insights
into why people decide to use, or not use, the official contact tracing app in their country of residence, how they
view the benefits and drawbacks of the app, and what security and privacy concerns they have. Our study is also
a cross-cultural one (Germany and France) conducted in a focus group setting, allowing participants to discuss and
examine any similarities and differences in their perceptions and expectations.
3 CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION
3.1 Epidemiological situation in France and Germany
Following a decline in the number of confirmed cases and the associated morbidity and mortality rates, which in most
European countries peaked in April and early May of 2020, the summer months of 2020 saw a relaxation of the stringent
lockdowns and restrictions imposed during the first wave of the pandemic [9]. The second wave, however, emerged as
much more disastrous with the number of deaths mounting even in Germany [29], which was largely perceived as a
country that was successfully tackling the pandemic at its onset [8]. By late October 2020, a dramatic increase in the
number of confirmed infections (as illustrated in Figure 1) as well as hospital and emergency unit admissions could be
observed, leading to a renewed imposition of tighter control measures in various European countries [9].
In an effort to tackle the new surge of COVID-19 in France, a second nationwide lockdown began on October 30,
2020 [16]. While it was characterized by a higher number of exceptions in comparison to the first lockdown, such as
schools and certain sectors remaining open, all non-essential stores and activities were again closed, working from
home was requested whenever possible, and restrictions on movement were reimposed. Consequently, any activity
requiring people to leave their homes, such as accessing essential services, food shopping, or outdoor exercising had to
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Data source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 2021, www.ecdc.europa.eu
Fig. 1. Overview of the epidemiological situation in France and Germany in 2020.
be declared in a specific form called Certificate of Travel Restriction Waiver (Attestation de déplacement dérogatoire) that
had to be carried at all times [18]. 38% of the people polled by YouGov in November 2020 thought that France handled
the pandemic very or somewhat well [36].
In response to the spiraling coronavirus crisis in Germany, a partial lockdown was imposed on November 2, 2020
[12]. While being a softer version of the restrictions imposed during the first wave, the partial lockdown, nevertheless,
entailed closure of most non-essential premises, restrictions on meeting in public spaces, and limits on the number of
people allowed to visit someone else’s home. Unnecessary travel was strongly discouraged, while working from home
was expected to be the norm. Regarding people’s perceptions of the German government’s handling of the pandemic,
in mid-November 2020, 55% of the people polled by YouGov thought that it was handled very or somewhat well [37].
3.2 Contact tracing apps in France and Germany
France. Built upon the centralized ROBERT (ROBust and privacy-presERving proximity Tracing) protocol [5], the
official French contact tracing app was initially called StopCovid when it was launched on June 2, 2020. In an effort
to address certain limitations and make progress with respect to the initial low adoption figures of StopCovid among
the French population, the government relaunched the app based on the same technical principles, under the name
TousAntiCovid on October 22, 2020, effectively replacing the previous version [28]. According to the open dataset
published by the Ministry of Solidarity and Health of France [15], by November 20, 2020, the StopCovid/TousAntiCovid
app was downloaded 9.26m times in total (roughly by 14% of the population1). 48,959 people had confirmed their
infection with COVID-19 using the app, while 12,901 people were notified by the app about exposure to COVID-19 [15].
Germany. Abandoning the initial plans of developing a contact tracing app based on a centralized software architecture
akin to the one in France [7], the official German contact tracing app, called Corona-Warn-App, was launched on June
16, 2020 based on the DP-3T (Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing) protocol [34]. As per the published
facts and figures on November 20, 2020 by the federal government agency responsible for disease control and prevention
1As of 2020, population of France: 67.3m [11]
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[30], the app was downloaded 22.8m times in total (roughly by 27% of the population2). More than 3.9m test results
(both positive and negative) were communicated to users via the app, and 56% of the positive results were further
shared by the users in order to alert others and break the chain of infections [30]. Corona-Warn-App was among the
first three contact tracing apps in Europe to link to the EU interoperability gateway system, allowing for a seamless
exchange of information between apps (and across borders) based on a decentralized architecture [10].
4 METHODOLOGY
To answer our research questions, we conducted eight focus group sessions with 24 participants in total (12 per country)
during the second half of November 2020.
Participants. Study recruitment was conducted via Prolific, an online crowdsourcing platform3. Several control
measures were set as pre-screening filters, such as current country of residence (France or Germany), desktop access,
and willingness to participate in video interviews. To encourage greater representation and inclusion, eligible candidates
were then provided with potential dates, so that they could register for a focus group session. Upon selecting a suitable
time slot, participants were sent a link to the online session that they would take part in. Online sessions were hosted
on the Webex video conferencing system and facilitated by the Miro collaborative platform4. This resulted in a total of
eight focus groups (four French and four German), lasting for approximately one hour each. Sessions took place during
the day and in the evening to meet participants’ schedules.
Ethics. Our study was approved by our institution’s ethics review panel, and informed consent was obtained from all
participants. Participants’ names and personal details were kept anonymous. Participants were also given the option to
use a pseudonym when participating in the online session hosted on Webex and facilitated by Miro. All 62 participants
that took part in the short pre-screening survey were compensated £0.09, corresponding to Prolific’s fair rewarding
practice of at least £5.00 ($6.50) per hour. 24 of these participants were subsequently compensated at an hourly rate of
£10 for their participation in the focus group sessions, as per Prolific’s recommendations.
Focus Groups. The focus groups, which ranged in size from two to four participants, adopted a semi-structured
approach based on the guide available in Appendix A. After briefly introducing contact tracing apps – supported by
excerpts from the World Health Organization (WHO)5 – and making sure that participants understood key terminology,
we asked a series of questions.
Participants were asked to take part in a number of individual and group activities (as prompted by each question)
using Miro. As depicted in Figure 2, Miro is a collaborative platform where individual projects, by default consisting of
a blank canvas, can be created and shared with (anonymous) guests who can view or edit the canvas using a series of
tools. For each focus group, a separate project consisting of several boards was created. Each board was dedicated to
one question from our focus group guide.
The first author of this paper moderated all focus group sessions and guided participants through the questions and
discussion. For each question, which was written on the top of the board, participants were asked to share and document
their thoughts using color-coded notes that they attached to the board, to achieve breadth of knowledge and collect as
many individual experiences as possible. This was followed by short plenary group discussions (before jumping to
2As of 2020, population of Germany: 83.2m [11]
3https://www.prolific.co, retrieved August 16, 2021
4https://www.miro.com, retrieved August 16, 2021
5https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-2019-nCoV-Contact_Tracing-Tools_Annex-2020.1, retrieved August 16, 2021
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Fig. 2. The Miro online collaborative platform used in the focus group sessions
the next question), to glean insights into and explore individual experiences in depth through group discourse. Each
participant was given the chance to address and build on the comments of other participants in the group. When
necessary, the moderator asked individual participants direct questions to ensure all views were considered.
Data analysis. The data collected and analyzed for the purpose of this study included individually written participant
answers (color-coded notes on the Miro platform) and group discussions (transcripts of Webex recordings). Session
recordings were transcribed, and individual notes were exported to MAXQDA, to allow for subsequent thematic analysis.
Tags denoting the French and German groups were included for all notes. The thematically-driven questions on the Miro
boards were used as a guide for the creation of first-level codes (e.g., adoption/non adoption factors, benefits/drawbacks,
etc.), which we used to analyze the focus group data (i.e., individual answers and discussion points). Inductive coding
was then used to produce second-level codes, which we used to analyze the data in depth and formulate insights.
Preliminary coding of the data collected from one focus group session was undertaken by the lead researcher. The
coding was then independently verified by a second researcher, to refine the codebook, resolve disagreements, and
reach consensus about the identified coding categories. The data collected from the other three focus group sessions
was then coded by the lead researcher, in consultation with the second researcher when necessary. Our qualitative
codebook can be found in Appendix B.
5 FINDINGS
Table 1 provides an overview of our participant demographics.
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Table 1. Participant demographics. N=12 per country.
Demographics France Germany
Female 4 (33%) 7 (58%)
Male 8 (67%) 5 (42%)
Median age 30 31
Age range [20 – 62] [26 – 54]
National residents 5 (42%) 10 (83%)
Foreign residents 7 (58%) 2 (17%)
Employed (full-time or part-time) 8 (67%) 10 (83%)
Student status 4 (33%) 2 (17%)
Currently use a national contact tracing app 2 (17%) 8 (67%)
Used a national contact tracing app in the past, but stopped using it 3 (25%) 1 (8%)
Have not used a national contact tracing app 7 (58%) 3 (25%)
5.1 Reasons for adoption
The following themes were identified as dominant reasons for installing and using contact tracing apps by focus group
participants. Participants included those that at the time of the study used or had previously used a contact tracing app.
5.1.1 Desire to act responsibly and exercise civic responsibility. Participants from both countries (France and Germany)
viewed the adoption of contact tracing apps as a means to contribute to a greater societal cause and to help prevent the
spread of coronavirus. This is depicted more clearly by the following statements:
• “to limit the propagation of the virus as efficiently as possible – a civic duty, I guess ” (FR, p7)
• “helping scientists do their job ” (DE, p22)
• “supporting the society ” (DE, p23)
One participant viewed the adoption and use of a contact tracing app as a self-imposed duty to (positively) influence
others’ beliefs and behaviors in this regard: “To be a role model ... to encourage friends, colleagues to use that by themselves.
Show to my kids that I want to do everything [that] I can do” (DE, p23).
5.1.2 Personal safety. Another recurring theme and key motivator for adoption was the desire to protect oneself and
others, especially family members, friends, elderlies, and vulnerable people (at-risk groups):
• “because I want to know if I have been in contact with an infected person” (DE, p19)
• “to know if I am under risk” (DE, p17)
• “take precautions like self isolation if appropriate ” (DE, p15)
• “to stay safe and take care of family and friends ” (DE, p20)
• “protecting the parent generation ” (DE, p23)
5.1.3 Security, privacy, and trust. Feeling in (partial) control of the data collected, taking an informed approach regarding
the type and use of data handled, and having trust in the government and/or app developers handling the data were
voiced as motivating factors that increase adoption of contact tracing apps and/or minimize users’ privacy concerns.
• “A lot of warnings and options to respect the privacy of every user - seemed like a safe choice to use it” (FR, p7)
• “because they’re safe when it comes to my data” (DE, p19)
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5.1.4 Other reasons. Being curious about trying out a ‘new technology’, evolving social dynamics (e.g., increased social
interactions and the desire to avoid lockdowns), and requests to install a contact tracing app by an employer or when
traveling abroad were all mentioned as reasons why participants installed and/or considered using contact tracing apps.
Moreover, several participants indicated that although they preferred to voluntarily install an app, they would still
install an app even if it were mandatory to do so. In contrast, others demonstrated a preference for a more mandated
approach. One participant specifically voiced refusing to install a contact tracing app, precisely because it was voluntary
to do so, questioning the app’s reliability and placing greater trust in a more mandated approach. We describe reasons
for non-adoption next.
5.2 Reasons for non-adoption
5.2.1 Lack of utility. A significant number of participants believed that there was no added benefit or value of existing
contact tracing apps, as illustrated by these verbatims:
• “don’t think it’s necessary” (FR, p10)
• “I don’t think that I need to use an app like this” (FR, p12)
Moreover, the second (partial) lockdown which overlapped with our focus group sessions, seemed to have impelled
participants to further question the usefulness of the apps in light of remote working and more general self-isolation
measures, as the following expressions highlight:
• “I do not need them because of home office” (DE, p13)
• “I have never been in the situation to use one, I’m mostly at home” (DE, p18)
This lack of perceived utility or perceived benefit was both driven by and in turn reinforced low adoption rates.
Participants considered the number of current users of a contact tracing app (and how in turn they perceived its value)
when making their own decisions to adopt or not adopt the app.
• “Even [if] smartphone was activated, wouldn’t have done it because no one seemed to be doing it. The consensus was
that it was not very efficient.” (FR, p4)
• “It’s still like a trial at the moment, I feel like it needs to be out... so basically, I don’t” (DE, p18)
5.2.2 Lack of trust. A number of factors and entities were brought up in the context of trust. Participants mentioned
that they did not necessarily trust their government, the developers of the contact tracing app, nor the technology itself.
• “the results of those apps with the underlying technology do not work as intended, especially the distance cannot be
determined precisely” (DE, p13)
• “Not accurate enough due to the Bluetooth used as a technology” (FR, p5)
• “I do not trust the companies which developed the app” (DE, p13)
• “Not enough information about the editor [developer]” (FR, p3)
• “the State might be given more powers via this app to track people beyond the purpose of seeing who is infected (such
as whether you are respecting the lockdown)” (FR, p9)
5.2.3 Lack of clarity and communication. Poor public communication, in terms of clarity and outreach, and lack of public
engagement were issues that emerged from our focus groups and were especially discussed by French participants.
• “...[it] wasn’t really explained, they said you can download it, it would be a good idea, but had no idea of what the
use of this would be” (FR, p4)
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• “You don’t know where and who owns the data in the end. When the government told about that application, they
told it was a private company and we use Bluetooth, but we do not keep the tracing data. So it’s a little bit difficult to
tell.” (FR, p1)
Participants also stressed the additional effort being placed on them to understand the purpose of a contact tracing app.
• “The benefits of using it are not clearly explained by the State. Unless one does the research, it may seem as just a
useless battery-consuming app” (FR, p7)
The government’s approach to persuading the population to start using a contact tracing app was perceived as
paternalistic by some participants, which resulted in unwillingness to participate in the collective action.
• “they treat us as children so I acted as a child” (FR, p1)
In this context, participants also expressed lack of role models promoting app adoption. Some participants believed
that public figures and government officials did not install contact tracing apps.
5.2.4 Poor usability. In addition to lack of utility, some participants mentioned that contact tracing apps drained their
phone’s battery, while others found using and interacting with the apps complicated, resulting in them not using the
apps (any longer).
• “Not user friendly, they need to create something easy to understand to make it popular” (FR, p6)
5.2.5 The ostrich effect. Psychological and practical discomforts resulting from the apps’ potential exposure notifications
were mentioned by participants as reasons for not adopting contact tracing apps.
• “I’m afraid of what will happen if it counts me as an infected person - I prefer not knowing!”
(FR, p7 quoting a friend)
Other participants explained that they did not find the current privacy-preserving mechanisms in contact tracing
apps flexible or reliable enough to meet the needs of citizens who were willing to share more private data in return for
more contextual information.
• “If I would use the app, I think I would have, to be frank, a psychological problem. If I get an alarm I would like to
know where I put myself at risk, as I am extremely careful. I’m not carrying a normal mask, I’m wearing a gas mask,
with highly-effective filters, I wear highly-effective protection glasses, I always carry gloves and I only go shopping
when it is absolutely necessary. If I would get an alarm, I would be really concerned what I have done wrong and
where I put myself at risk” (DE, p21)
5.3 Benefits and Drawbacks
The benefits highlighted by participants in the focus groups corresponded to and echoed the reasons why participants
decided to adopt a contact tracing app. Reasons included helping identify and break chains and clusters of infection,
identifying potential risks, and informatively deciding and planning next steps.
• “Ability to trace the possible infections scenarios objectively - when getting tested as “positive” a person often forgets
to warn every single person he/she contacted” (FR, p7)
• “knowing the risk level for myself, feel rather comfortable because others will be notified if I am infected and I can’t
reach the people I contacted by myself ” (DE, p17)
• “Knowing whether or not you should stay home/get things delivered or go out instead” (FR, p11)
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Recent improvements and additions of features in the French app, demonstrating contextual sensitivities to user
needs (i.e., administrative mobility considerations during lockdown), albeit not directly linked to the act of digital
contact tracing, were appreciated by participants who used the app. These voiced benefits could potentially mobilize
people to adopt contact tracing apps.
• “While the former functions were just “nice to have” (just global security, but no everyday “usefulness”), the attestations
management was a really nice feature for everyday use” (FR, p7)
• “[decided to use TousAntiCovid] for easier making of the attestations as it collects previous information” (FR, p11)
While making a link between perceived benefits and reasons for adoption is straightforward, and arguably the voiced
themes in this section could be analyzed in conjunction with Section 5.1, here we are interested in developing a better
understanding of the benefits highlighted by participants who had not used a contact tracing app before.
Unsurprisingly, even participants who had not used contact tracing apps agreed to a great extent with the potential
benefits of these apps.
• “To know if you have got the virus or if you’re exposed to” (FR, p3)
• “help scientists get enough data about the pandemic and the spreading behavior of the virus” (DE, p24)
• “I discovered that we can complete attestations faster, [I could] globally gain some time” (FR, p12)
Nevertheless, there were some participants, albeit a very small number, that did not see any benefits of these apps
personally or whatsoever.
• “for really frightend people this could help to ease their minds or to give them the feeling of security ” (DE, p13)
• “I will not have the app to tell me, my friend or family if they have covid will just tell me” (FR, p9)
• “searching for the benefits... but I couldn’t figure it” (FR, p6)
As for drawbacks, participants who used the French and German apps highlighted a number of shortcomings with
regard to what and how apps communicated information to users as well as the general app design. Most participants
touched upon the fact that current apps provided insufficient procedural information and did not offer personalized and
useful information (e.g., personal risk levels).
• “People don’t know what to do with certain warning levels” (DE, p14)
• “somehow quantify my personal risk better, but result is poor, no personal gain, only confusion (by usage, by
information about risks)” (DE, p23)
Further, contact tracing apps were perceived as lacking interactivity. In this regard, participants offered their input
and suggested the design of features that would address some of their unmet needs.
• “Feature request: to receive the latest updates about the pandemic and specific to my area” (DE, p18)
• “It would be nice to have a list of places where you can go and get a test, news about new developments on the
pandemic situation, list of special places that are crowded and not to be visited etc.” (DE, p17)
Our participants also mentioned costs and expenses, such as the usage of own mobile data plans, device data storage,
and battery drainage as drawbacks they were concerned about.
Another issue mentioned by participants revolved around the poor implementation of a Test-Trace-Isolate strategy,
which in some cases could render contact tracing apps useless.
• “problem is also the accuracy, who did really have it... maybe i’m positive but i never tested, because there is not
enough hospital staff to do it nor test itself is accurate enough” (FR, p6)
• “the data is a few days old, so if you’re infected, you could already have been a risk for others” (DE, p19)
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Finally, some of the drawbacks mentioned referred to the security and privacy aspects of contact tracing apps.
• “in theory it could be tracked where I have been, probably through the contacts but I think that is unlikely” (DE, p15)
• “I can see why there would be privacy concerns (because it asks for your location), but since I was in other countries
that utilize COVID19 applications, it didn’t bother me anymore (due to priming).” (FR, p11)
5.4 Privacy concerns and threats
One of the most prominent privacy concerns particularly raised by participants residing in France was location tracking.
This was mentioned among other concerns with regard to the power that governments and involved parties could exert
by gathering large amounts of data through the app.
• “I think they ask for too much information” (FR, p2)
• “the government can track the people and abuse the data” (FR, p5)
• “it invades my privacy and I don’t want the state to know where I am and who I am with” (FR, p7 quoting a friend)
• “the government institutions could learn my activities, my habits, maybe even commercial vendors, difficult to
know...” (FR, p5)
These are valid concerns taking into consideration the many unknowns and ongoing efforts to find and fix vulnera-
bilities in this domain of security and privacy research [4]. Nevertheless, participant discussions shed light on potential
misunderstandings of the technicalities of contact tracing (i.e., exhibiting examples of folk models). We also speculate
that participant discussions about geophysical location tracking might as well be due to specific (mis)understandings of
how digital contact tracing apps work and what the apps’ actual adversarial model is. Yet, some participants did not
express any privacy concerns in this specific context.
• “Not really concerned about “privacy” of my geolocation and interaction data, especially for a
state-backed app” (FR, p7)
• “not really... the government can find a lot of things about me or anybody already, they don’t need this sort of app
for that info, so not concerned” (FR, p4)
As for adversaries, our participants mostly mentioned their government followed by app developers, referring to
companies behind app development and not individual programmers. In this regard, participants were mostly concerned
about either not having sufficient levels of trust to start with, hindering adoption by default, or experiencing negative
outcomes as a result of erosion of trust which was placed in the collective response to the pandemic.
• “I don’t want anyone to know about my location history. I am willing to share this in the app only to protect myself
and others but without the individual details. If the government, or app developers, any company, any third party
could possibly know about this for any reason other than covid-tracing I would be very uncomfortable.” (DE, p17)
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Summary of results
Our findings suggest that, quite often, participants demonstrated a sense of civic responsibility and willingness to adopt
contact tracing apps. However, our findings also show that miscommunicating the purpose and benefits of contact
tracing apps, insufficient user inclusion (in the app design process), and lack of transparency (with regard to app
functionality and data collection and processing) are factors that hinder the adoption of contact tracing apps.
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The investigation into perceived benefits and drawbacks of contact tracing apps echoed and served to further
reinforce why participants might have chosen to adopt/not adopt their country’s official contact tracing app. The intent
to contribute to a more societal mission (i.e., identifying risks and exposure) was most prominent in the discourse.
Instances of participants finding personal value and/or daily relevance of the app (e.g., easing the attestation process)
were seen as beneficial. In contrast, lack of personalization in current apps, poor interactivity, and lack of communication
were expressed as drawbacks impacting perceived relevance and usefulness.
Ultimately, participants did voice concerns regarding the possible risks of location tracking as well as the placement
of trust in enabling the collection and creation of rich individual data profiles that could potentially be misused.
Nevertheless, these privacy concerns and perceived threats seemed to be mostly overshadowed by other needs across
the focus groups. This raises the question as to whether the perceived benefits and usefulness of contact tracing apps
are on par with, if not even more important than, privacy-preserving features when it comes to adoption.
6.2 Similarities and differences between and within study groups
In an effort to better understand and represent the different perspectives that were expressed during the sessions as
well as to position similar views in relative proximity to each other, we divided our study participants into four groups






LOW SECURITY & PRIVACY CONCERNS





Adopter  | FR
Adopter  | DE
Non-adopter  | FR



















Fig. 3. Affinity mapping of focus group participants based on their responses
French participants that used a contact tracing app are represented using a blue circle next to their ID. German
adopters are represented using a red circle. Those that had not adopted an app are represented using a square next to
their ID, in blue and red, to denote French and German non-adopters, respectively. The two axes divide the space along
the dimensions of (x) the perception of benefits and (y) security & privacy concerns.
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Group A The bottom-right quadrant consists solely of adopters of contact tracing apps that have low security and
privacy concerns, and for whom the perceived benefits of contact tracing apps outweigh any drawbacks by far.
Group B The bottom-left region gathers non-adopters who, despite having low or moderate security and privacy
concerns, decided not to adopt a contact tracing app because they do not perceive the benefits or added values of
the available contact tracing app in their country or in general.
Group C The upper-left quadrant gathers those participants that have moderate to high concerns about security
and privacy associated with the usage of contact tracing apps. Furthermore, they either do not see the benefits of
using such apps, or for them the drawbacks outweigh any benefits.
Group D The upper-right quadrant consists of both adopters and non-adopters. Both groups share moderate
security and privacy concerns; however, for the first group, the perceived benefits associated with using a contact
tracing app outweigh any drawbacks or concerns. For the latter, the perceived benefits are not there yet for them
to decide to adopt or continue using a contact tracing app.
Looking at the distribution of our small sample of French and German participants across the four groups, we can
observe that German study participants mostly fall in Group A; i.e., they clearly saw the benefits of using contact
tracing apps and they expressed low to moderate security and privacy concerns. In contrast, the lack of perceived
benefits was overwhelming among the French study participants, who are divided into two equal sets based on the
level of concern with respect to security and privacy.
Contextualizing the adoption trend observed in our focus groups using the official adoption figures of the German
and French contact tracing apps reported in November 2020 (see Section 3.2), we can see that our findings are in line
with the higher adoption figures in Germany compared to France at the time of the study. Interestingly, this contrasts
with the cross-cultural investigations of Altmann et al. [2] who reported that intentions to use contact tracing apps
among Germans would be lower due to security and privacy concerns.
While this is certainly a question worthy of further exploration, we speculate that the following factors could have
contributed to the higher adoption rate among Germans:
• A public debate on the benefits and drawbacks of centralized and decentralized approaches to contact tracing,
contributing to the decentralized architecture of the Corona-Warn-App and the discourse surrounding it. For
instance, German participants reported that it was common knowledge that in Germany a lot of emphasis is
placed on data protection. Thus, while the majority of our German participants did not express security and
privacy concerns, this should not be interpreted as if they had no concerns in general, but rather that they did
not have these concerns with regard to Corona-Warn-App.
• The higher levels of trust in the government and positive perceptions of the government’s handling of the crisis.
According to Kostka and Habich-Sobiegalla, whether or not people have trust in the government has a powerful
impact on the acceptance of contact tracing apps in Germany [21].
• The perception of a streamlined and clear public communication of the app’s role and benefits as part of the
collective response to the pandemic, including deep integration in the country’s TTI strategy.
Looking at Group B, we can observe that for a number of French and German participants, security and privacy
concerns are not the (primary) obstacle to adoption. To make these participants become adopters, both countries would
need to work on the value proposition relevant to this potential user group. While some citizens may benefit from clear,
targeted, and streamlined communication of the benefits and ways to get onboarded, others may be motivated to join
only after a significant proportion of the population is already using a contact tracing app, which could potentially
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ease some of their doubts about effectiveness and accuracy. In this regard, additional useful features, such as the travel
restriction waiver certificate (attestation) in France or local and personalized information could potentially further
increase adoption.
While citizens that fall in Group C appear to be most resistant to adoption of contact tracing apps, some might decide
to adopt, provided that the benefits outweigh their perceived drawbacks, and their concerns with regard to security and
privacy are addressed or alleviated. To this end, the app’s usefulness and effectiveness need to be evident, and trust
needs to be established and nurtured. If we assume that this group corresponds to what Trang et al. have categorized as
critics [33], emphasis should particularly be placed on the societal benefits of contact tracing apps. Nevertheless, as
highlighted by Utz et al., we should expect that a certain number of people would be unwilling to adopt the app [35].
The question of trust is particularly important also for adopters in Group D, who are likely to discontinue using a
contact tracing app should the trust they placed be eroded. To ensure that this does not happen, all stakeholders involved
in the development, maintenance, and operation of the contact tracing app need to apply appropriate cybersecurity
measures and practice the highest ethical standards at all times.
Limitations. Our study has limitations that can be broadly attributed to the collection of self-report data, which does
not necessarily reflect actual behavior and the fast-tracked nature of the research conducted to inform the current and
future design of contact tracing apps. That said, we aimed – by conducting our focus groups – to elicit diverse views
and opinions, by offering flexible interview schedules and minimizing the use of Prolific’s prescreening filters to recruit
participants. However, our focus groups were conducted in English, which might have impacted how participants
expressed themselves (if English was not their first language). Further, as opposed to Prolific, in-situ and multi-channel
targeted recruitment approaches could have allowed us to reach out to a diverse sample of participants, based on age,
profession, and digital literacy, ensuring that different user profiles and risk groups were explicitly accounted for.
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we are aware that our study design and online participant recruitment approach
inevitably excluded a large portion of participants and made our findings less generalizable. Further, participating in
sessions in a hybrid fashion viaWebex and usingMiro to share thoughts, in contrast with a traditional in-situ focus group
discussion, might have required extra effort from participants who lacked prior experience with those communication
and collaboration platforms. While many welcomed this novel participatory approach, on a few occasions we had to
assist participants in attaching their notes or navigating Miro. In some cases, this might have got in the way of gleaning
additional insights into our investigation.
While we cannot exclude the possibility of social desirability bias toward the moderator and other focus group
participants, we believe that the wide range of responses and preferences expressed by our participants indicate that
heterogeneity of views was acquired. Furthermore, we did not observe tendencies of participants to take over the
discussion or devalue the opinions of others, and we ensured to offer every participant a chance to express their views.
Future Work. Future large-scale quantitative studies would enable greater generalizability of our findings. Future
work should also consider investigating the potential differences with respect to people’s opinions of centralized and
decentralized approaches. In this regard, our focus groups aimed to account for a balanced view (centralized and
decentralized) to answer our research questions. Furthermore, the unique socio-technical differences that different
countries may have to deal with to understand societal uptake are worth noting. Several differences were visible in
our focus groups among French and German participants, but those would require more systematic analysis for app
deployment and uptake.
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7 CONCLUSION
Considering human factors when exploring the adoption as well as the security and privacy aspects of COVID-19
contact tracing apps is a timely societal challenge. Our work aims to provide greater granularity and understanding of
the current more abstract quantitative investigations of contact tracing app adoption and use. Our findings complement
ongoing efforts from a socio-technical lens, given the complex and interdisciplinary needs required to overcome this
shared reality.
Our field notes also serve to highlight future recommendations for practice and policy. There is a broad spectrum of
user needs that contact tracing apps should take into consideration, in order to enhance uptake. Therefore, we believe
that it would be useful to explore and define “archetypes” reflecting the diverse decisions that people make to adopt
and use contact tracing apps. These in turn could be responsively leveraged to provide targeted, clear, and dedicated
communication pathways within and beyond the app (policy and practice action), as well as integrated functionalities
and design features (practice action).
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• Q1: Have you ever used an official contact tracing app nationally approved by a health authority or the government?
• Q2: Why did you decide to [use | not use] a national contact tracing app?
• Q3: What do you see as the major benefits (if any) of using a contact tracing app?
• Q4: What do you see as the major drawbacks (if any) of using a contact tracing app?
• Q5: What features of the contact tracing app [do you | did you] use? What [do you | did you] value most about the app?
• Q6: When travelling abroad, would you be willing to install a contact tracing app approved by the public health authorities or
government of the country where you are travelling to?
• Q7: Should a contact tracing app from your country be able to detect and share proximity contacts with other users of contact
tracing apps, regardless of the app or its country of origin?
• Q8: Are there any privacy concerns that you have with respect to the use of national contact tracing apps?
• Debrief
B APPENDIX – QUALITATIVE CODEBOOK
We present our codebook with the first- and second-level codes as well as their respective counts below.
• adoption (48): active social context (1), avoiding misinformation (1), curiosity (2), personal safety (7), influence (1), request / mandate
(1), security, privacy & trust (10), society (21), technical capability (1), usefulness (3); • non-adoption (64): herd mentality (3), lack of
efficiency (4), lack of interoperability (1), lack of promotion (1), lack of role models (2), lack of technical capability (1), distrust in the
government (6), distrust in the developers (2), distrust in the technology (4), lack of usability (8), lack of utility (12), limited / lack of
social interactions (4), privacy concerns (11), psychological discomfort (4), voluntary approach (1); • benefits (56): self-determination
(16), useful features (1), efficiency (2), staying informed (4), identification of potential risks (11), mental and emotional comfort (4), help in
modelling the spread (3), identification of infections (15); • drawbacks (47): potential repercussions (1), interoperability (1), costs and
expenses (9), lack of usability (3), lack of functionality (1), lack of perceived effectiveness (13), privacy invasion (6), lack of clear information
/ communication (6), lack of perceived benefits (7); • features (7): requests (7);
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